Frederick S. Tappenden has written an engaging study of the theme of resurrection in Paul that makes a rich use of cognitive linguistics and conceptual blending theory to show that Paul’s understanding of resurrection is fundamentally embodied. For those with an interest in linguistics and a bit of philosophy, the book will be pleasurable reading—new exegetical wine in new wineskins. For those who are not interested in linguistics and philosophy, however, the book will be of less use, and the plethora of technical terms (often underdefined) will be a serious distraction.

The first chapter (1–41) is entitled “The Disembodiment of Resurrection: Literature Review, Problem Definition, and the Integration of Cognition and Culture.” One of the bugbears Tappenden rejects is mind–body dualism, which he traces to the much-maligned René Descartes, the brilliant parent of modern philosophy (there are ten references to the opprobrious “Cartesian dualism” in the book). Already Tappenden is swimming in stormy metaphysical waters. I recall a British philosophy lecturer who complained that mind–body dualism is built into the nature of our language, and in that respect Tappenden himself is unable to avoid speaking of body and mind (both words appear numerous times in his book) despite his appeals to “mind–body holism” (6). He does concede that “folk dualism” is here to stay (a soft kind of Cartesian dualism), and he concedes that one can find both dualism and monism in Paul (14–15). In a discussion of Paul’s materialistic view of the resurrection (9–11, with reference to Troels Engberg-
Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010]), Tappenden appeals to the “theory of conceptual metaphor” as a way forward that breaks down the distinction between “literal” and “metaphorical” approaches to resurrection in Paul. Here he refers to works by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (e.g., *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989] and *Metaphors We Live By* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980]). What the sympathetic reader will find missing in Tappenden is an extended discussion of the concept of metaphor itself (the two books by Lakoff and Johnson also fail to offer a clear analysis of the concept at the beginning of their works, although by the end one knows what they are referring to). Tappenden capably reviews (15–32) Pauline ontology and cosmology (A. Schweitzer, Bultmann, Käsemann, etc.) and rejects all prior solutions. “Cognitive linguistics and embodied cognition” (33) are the recommended answer and offer us “a clear way out of the postmodern prison house of language without committing us to a rightly discredited form of Enlightenment realism” (33, quoting Edward Slingerland, *What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body and Culture* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008] 218). Already on page 38 Tappenden gives a diagram using conceptual blending theory. In the diagram the two “image schemas” are “Awake Asleep” and “Life Death,” which results in two metaphors L I F E I S B E I N G A W A K E a n d D E A T H I S S L E E P that are the conceptual blends. The generic space (which is shared by both image schemas) is U P D O W N . One (34) of his rare definitions is: “Image schemata are conceptual structures that are skeletal in nature (i.e., they have not rich but rather schematic content) and that arise experientially as a result of the kinds of bodies we have functioning in the kind of world in which we live.” To get a sense of what Tappenden is up to, one needs to consult the theoretical basis, which is a book by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (*The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities* [New York: Basic Books, 2002]).

The second chapter is entitled: “Imaging Resurrection: Toward an Image-Schematic Understanding of Resurrection Belief in Paul and in Second Temple Judaism” (43–86). The only hint the reader is given to the meaning of “gestalt” is “a recurrent constellation of concepts and image schemata that, when taken collectively as a gestalt, constitute the concept of RESURRECTION” (45). Tappenden’s survey of resurrection in Second Temple Judaism includes discussions of the cultural “frames” (51) of resurrection in texts such as 2 Maccabees (PERSECUTION) and the Epistle of Enoch (SOCIAL INJUSTICE). His fairly brief review of the resurrection gestalt in Paul includes the concepts of a macro-P A T H and micro-P A T H . One will search in vain for a clear definition of the first term, although on 55–56 Tappenden notes that “the VERTICALITY schema enabled conceptions along a single axis (orientated vertically), the path structure creates a second horizontal axis [‘such as time progressing toward a looming divine visitation’].” “Time” is an example of a
horizontal axis. Presumably the figure on 59 is an example of a macro-path (down [source] to up [goal]), the macro-path being portrayed by the diagonal line in the figure. An example of a micro-path in Paul is the change experienced by resurrected individuals.

The third chapter (87–133), “‘We Will All be Changed’: On Dualism/Monism, Plants, and the Peculiarity of Wearing a House,” is for me the heart of Tappenden’s book. A careful study of his analyses may result in fresh understanding of Paul’s use of resurrection imagery. One of Tappenden’s primary arguments is that metaphor pervades language and human thought. His close attention to Paul’s metaphors (“plant,” house,” “tent”) is refreshing in an already-crowded field. The conceptual blends he produces are convincing, and the examples he produces on 109, 111, and 113 (all on 1 Cor 15) indicate both the continuity and discontinuity characteristic of Paul’s resurrected bodies. One minor exegetical mistake I noticed is that on 112 he argues that Paul “asserts that different types of ‘flesh’ (σάρξ) exist on earth (that of humans, animals, birds and fish, 15:39), while different types of ‘glory’ (δόξα) exist in the heavens (the sun, moon and stars, 15:41).” The problem is that earthly bodies have their own δόξα (15:40), a fact Tappenden passes over. His treatment of resurrection in 2 Cor 4–5 is equally illuminating.

The title indicates the topic of the fourth chapter (135–73): “Eschatological Somatology: Identifying the Already and the Not Yet in Paul.” That is, in what sense can Paul be said to conceive of the resurrection as already transforming bodies now? Tappenden argues that Rom 6:1–11 and other texts do just that even though Paul does not use specific words for resurrection to describe baptism. With regard to Rom 7, he accepts Emma Wasserman’s thesis (The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Sin, Death, and the Law in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology, WUNT 256 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008]) that the “I” in the chapter is not Paul describing his own experience but a “rhetorical ‘I’ under the law” in which the rational part of the soul (νοῦς or ὁ ἐσω ἄνθρωπος) “is dominated by the irrational bit (ἀμαρτία)” (150). Here one would imagine Tappenden needed to spend at least a few pages defending such a controversial thesis, yet he accepts it with barely a murmur. Together with Rom 8:9–11, Tappenden uses Rom 6 and 7 to create an intriguing conceptual blend (161) that depicts the transformation of the postbaptismal body in Paul. The unsympathetic reader will be lost in a haze of symbols, but Tappenden does explain them on the prior pages.

In chapter 5 (175–227), “Participating in Resurrection: Union, Mutual Affectivity, and Ethnicity,” Tappenden combines many of his analyses in the book to examine Paul’s language of participation: ἐν Χριστῷ and σύν Χριστῷ. The union of Christ and the believer is a gestalt in Tappenden’s terminology (187). The blends in this chapter are
extremely complex and will tax the reader’s patience, but they deserve serious study for
those so inclined.

The conclusion, “Embodying Resurrection: Conclusions and Prospects,” usefully sums up
the book (229–37). There is a comprehensive bibliography (239–58), a set of indices for
ancient sources (258–72), a modern authors index (273–75), and a comprehensive subject
index (276–89).

Since scholars working with newer methodologies presumably are seeking to attract those
who are initially skeptical, a glossary at the end of the book would have provided a
welcome relief (e.g., “metaphor,” “conceptual metaphor,” “input space,” “generic space,”
“image schema,” “blended space,” “path,” “micro-path,” “macro-path,” “frame structure,”
“gestalt”). One can find references to these terms in the index, but often the references do
not provide clear definitions. One example will suffice. The index indicates that “frame
structure” appears on page 51, where we are given examples such as “PERSECUTION” in
2 Maccabees. But we are provided with no definition of the concept of “frame structure.”
The index provides the following frames: “(CELESTIAL) LUMINOSITY, CHRIST, CLOTHING,
CONSCIOUSNESS, ETHNOGRAPHIC RESTORATION, PERSECUTION, PLANT GROWTH, SELF-
MASTERY, and SOCIAL INJUSTICE.” This reviewer is on the side of the angels: the book is
well worth a close read and well worth the concomitant frustrations.

One might have expected interaction with the works of those in biblical studies who have
used conceptual blending before this, such as Vernon Robbins, The Invention of Christian
Blending and Early Christian Imagination,” in Explaining Christian Origins and Early
Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science, ed. Petri Luomanen, Ilkka
Pyysäinen, and Risto Uro, BibInt 89 (Leiden: Brill, 2007) 161-195, repr. in Foundations
for Sociorhetorical Exploration: A Rhetoric of Religious Antiquity Reader, ed. Vernon K.
in the same volume, Robert H. von Thaden, “A Cognitive Turn: Conceptual Blending
within a Sociorhetorical Framework,” 285–328; von Thaden, “Pauline Rhetorical
Invention: Seeing 1 Corinthians 6:12–7:7 through Conceptual Integration Theory; A
Cognitive Turn,” in Cognitive Linguistic Explorations in Biblical Studies, ed. Bonnie Howe
and Joel B. Green (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014) 99–120 (there are nearly fifty references to
categorical blending in this book); and von Thaden, Sex, Christ, and Embodied Cognition:
Paul’s Wisdom for Corinth (Dover, UK: Deo, 2012; repr. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017). In
addition, forty years ago philosopher Earl R. MacCormac carefully analyzed the
importance of metaphor in science and religion (Metaphor and Myth in Science and
Religion [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976]). To be fair to Tappenden, a
bibliography from 1985 has more than 400 pages of work on metaphor published after

The usual objection to books such as that by Tappenden is that the reader gets lost in a morass of terminology, which obscures any exegetical gains. Tappenden apparently does not foresee such an objection, and it would have been astute of him to engage it in his conclusion. One can only hope that scholars interested in the theme of resurrection in Paul will devote careful study to this intriguing and creative book.